The Metaphysical Doctrine of Creation by Morris, Thomas V.
The Metaphysical 
Doctrine of Creation 
THOMAS V. MORRIS 
The majestic introduction to the book of Genesis proclaims that1 
In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. 
This is the key to a distinctively theistic perspective on reality. This one 
statement captures the heart of a theistic world-view: We live in a created 
universe. For centuries, theists have held that the most important truth 
about our world is that it is a created world. And it is no exaggeration to 
add that one of the most important truths about God is that He is the creator 
of this world. 
Aquinas once expressed the core of the doctrine of creation quite suc-
cinctly with the single sentence: 
Anything that exists in any way must necessarily have its origin 
fromGod.2 
The philosophical view which is here so crisply and simply conveyed, I 
shall refer to as the metaphysical doctrine of creation. I understand it as a thesis 
about the metaphysical or ontological dependence of all things distinct from 
God on God as their source of being, the ultimate cause of their existence. 
As a philosophical thesis, the metaphysical doctrine of creation is not to 
be thought of as necessarily allied to, or as in competition with, any particu-
lar scientific theory of physical cosmology or biological development. A few 
years ago, many religious people enthusiastically welcomed and loudly en-
dorsed what is popularly known as the Big Bang Theory of Physical Cosmol-
ogy. The physical event which was postulated to have issued in an almost 
inconceivable, explosive origination of our current cosmos was widely bap-
tized as a scientific acknowledgement of the act of divine creation. But, as 
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many physical cosmologists were quick to point out, the postulation of the 
Big Bang is not at all the same thing as the acknowledgement of an absolute 
origination of all things physical from some nonphysical, divine source. The 
theorized explosion is compatible with an oscillating universe cosmology, 
according to which, on a colossal time scale, there are repetitive cycles of 
explosion, expansion, equilibrium and contraction, resulting in a further ex-
plosion, and so forth. An intelligent person can accept a Big Bang cosmology 
without endorsing any form of divine creation, or can adopt the metaphysi-
cal doctrine of creation without any commitment to the hypothesized Big 
Bang. A theist might, for example, endorse instead some form of the alterna-
tive tale told by recent plasma physics. Physics is not metaphysics. So in or-
der to understand the theistic doctrine of creation, it is important to keep 
these two enterprises of human intellectual explanation distinct. 
Nor is the metaphysical doctrine of creation alone to be viewed as a de-
terminant of biological theory. In recent years, there have been high-pitched 
courtroom battles and skirmishes in the popular press between people 
widely known as creationists and others, called evolutionists by the creation-
ists. However this ongoing debate is to be understood, it is not a debate in 
metaphysics, or in basic philosophical theology. Within the world of serious 
religious believers, there are both theistic creationists and theistic evolution-
ists in the battle over developmental biology. Biology is not metaphysics. 
Our concern in this essay with the doctrine of creation will be entirely a 
concern with some of the fundamental metaphysical and philosophical is-
sues faced by any traditional theist who thinks of God as altogether perfect, 
however he might appraise current theories of physical cosmology and bio-
logical development. We are seeking a level of understanding distinct from 
that promised by any application of the methods of the natural sciences. 
And our focus will be not so much on the natural world itself as on some of 
what can be learned about God by reflecting on the metaphysical doctrine 
that He is its creator, the ultimate source of its existence. 
THE NATURE OF CREATION 
In order to grasp what it means for God to be the world's creator, we 
need to examine some of what has been said about the act of divine creation, 
the nature of the activity itself, as well as about the dependence of God's 
creatures on Him which results from that activity. It will be natural to begin 
with a consideration of God's activity of creating. 
It is often said that divine creation is an activity that is completely free, 
rational and good. People can, and usually do, mean a variety of things by 
this threefold characterization. I believe we can explicate them best by con-
sidering these three characteristics in reverse order. We shall thus explore 
first what is meant by the goodness of divine creation, then its rationality, 
and finally, its freedom. This will be a proper ordering of our examination 
due to the fact that, as will become clear, the goodness of creation informs 
its rationality, and both together structure its freedom. 
The Metaphysical Doctrine of Creation 97 
In the Anselmian tradition of Perfect Being Theology, God is thought of 
as the greatest possible being, a being whose goodness could not possibly be 
surpassed by that of any other individual. And in all main streams of Chris-
tian philosophical theology, God is conceived of as a perfectly good agent. 
And as we shall see, a perfectly good agent's character can be expected to be 
manifested in his actions. Now, it is easy to see that the fundamental activity 
of creation, as performed by God, is the most basic giving of being. Human 
creation, by contrast, involves a using of being in novel ways. Any act of crea-
tion on the part of a creature presupposes the existence of things not 
brought into existence by that creative agent. Creaturely creation thus works 
with what is already given. Divine creation is more thorough-going and is 
not to be thought of as an operation performed upon something already ex-
isting. And since this most basic giving of being is thought to be the prov-
ince of God alone, this sort of creation can be thought of as the most distinc-
tively divine activity. As such, then, it should manifest God's goodness if 
anything does. It should be good. And, appropriately, from early on in the 
book of Genesis, we are told that God surveyed the products of His creative 
acts and saw that they were good, very good.3 
But here we run up against what can be thought to be a philosophical 
problem. We expect any act of divine creation to be a good act. And it seems 
natural to suppose that no act of creation can be good unless its product, 
what is created, is itself also good. For, ideally, good gives rise to good. But 
this is where the problem arises. If God is the greatest possible being, no act 
of creation can result in anything greater. It is just impossible that anything 
be greater than a greatest possible being. Now, consider our universe as 
God's creation, the product of His creating activity. Either the universe has 
positive value, or it does not. But if it does have positive value, then it seems 
we are forced to admit that God plus the universe is greater than God alone. 
For if God manifests some positive level of value n and the universe mani-
fests at least a single unit of positive value, 1, then the additive value of God 
plus the universe is at least n + 1, which is greater than n. But it is impossible 
that anything be greater than God, so it is impossible that the universe have 
positive value. 
This, however, seems to leave us with something equally unacceptable. 
For if the created universe has no positive value whatsoever, then nothing 
in it has positive value. If parts of the universe had value, then, as the sum 
of its parts, the universe would have positive value. But if nothing in the 
universe has value, human life has no value. Nor could God have been right 
when He gazed upon various items in creation and perceived them to be 
good. But these conclusions are totally unacceptable from a Christian, or tra-
ditionally theistic, point of view. It is impossible that God be wrong in His 
perceptions, or judgments, and as created in God's image, human beings 
must be of value. Furthermore, if nothing in the universe has any positive 
value, what reason could God possibly have had to create it? 
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Either the universe has value or it doesn't. There is no third option. But 
either supposition seems to get us into trouble, yielding, as it does, some 
impossibility or other. We thus seem to be faced with a true dilemma. Let us 
refer to it as the Dilemma of Created Goodness. Some such line of reasoning 
has troubled many people who have reflected on the nature of creation. For-
tunately, however, it is a problem which is easy to solve. 
We must first clearly distinguish between a being, an entity, an individ-
ual, on the one hand, and any state of affairs which involves that individual. 
The distinction is a well-known, fundamental and quite simple one. I am an 
individual being, my Pelikan 800 fountain pen is an individual entity, and 
we are both involved in the state of affairs of my writing this sentence with my 
Pelikan 800 fountain pen. Likewise, we must carefully distinguish between 
the state of affairs of that fountain pen's existing and the object which is that 
fountain pen. 
With this sort of distinction clearly in mind, we can clarify exactly what 
the central claim of Perfect Being Theology is: It is that God is to be thought 
of as the greatest possible being. And that is a claim that does not entail the 
separate proposition that the state of affairs of God's existing alone is the 
greatest possible state of affairs. This latter proposition is one that the 
Anselmian theist can deny. And it is one which the Christian theist will 
deny. Following the affirmations of the book of Genesis, and in accordance 
with some metaphysical or axiological principles connecting the goodness 
of God with the goodness of His creation, we can acknowledge that the state 
of affairs consisting in God's sharing existence with our created universe is 
greater than the state of affairs of God's existing in pristine isolation, or soli-
tude. But from this, it does not follow that there is any being or individual 
greater than God. This would be the case only if God and the created uni-
verse could be thought of as parts of a larger object, God-and-the-world, 
which could be assigned a value as a distinct individual, additively derived 
from the values of its parts. And this is prohibited for at least two reasons. 
First, there is no natural principle of unity in accordance with which God 
and the created universe would together compose one object.4 Second, it is 
conceptually precluded by Perfect Being Theology that God ever be consid-
ered a part of a larger and more valuable whole, an entity distinct from, but 
partially composed by, God. With all this in mind, we can affirm the posi-
tive value, even the great positive value, of the created universe without 
thereby posing any threat to the conception of God as the greatest possible 
being and without any risk of contradiction arising in connection with that 
conception. With sufficient care in our thought about God and creation, the 
Dilemma of Created Goodness does not arise at all. 
In creating our universe, most theists have supposed that God brought 
into existence goodness, or value, He was not obligated to bring into exis-
tence. That is to say, in creating He brought into existence good things, valu-
able things, which need not have existed. As productive of good, and as 
both freely and intentionally productive of good, the activity of creation it-
self is good. 
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What is it for creation to be rational? Part of what we can mean to con-
vey when we characterize creation as rational is that it is thoroughly inten-
tional in character. There is nothing "blind" about divine creation. God does 
not say "let there be something or other" and then look to see what has 
come into being. He is, rather, thoroughly superintendent over all the de-
tails of creation. There is nothing inadvertent or unintentional in God's 
bringing being into existence. 
Further, it is part of the rationality of creation that it is purposive. It is di-
rected toward some goal perceived to be of value. In particular, many theo-
logians and philosophers have specified, God creates in order to share His 
being and His glory. What He creates, He creates to that end. Of course, in 
order to be rational, it is not enough that an activity be goal directed or pur-
posive. Goal-oriented behavior can be stupid, clumsily devised and ineffec-
tive. In order to be thoroughly rational, a behavior or activity must be teleol-
ogically efficadous, effectively directed to the telos or end in view. 
And finally, in order to be rational, the activity of creation cannot be 
thoroughly arbitrary. Creation cannot be, as some Hindu theology has it, the 
arbitrary, free play of the deity. In order to be rational, or reasonable, the ac-
tivity of divine creation must be in some way expressive of God's character 
and nature. There must be some deep consonance or harmony between the 
nature of the act of creation and the character of the creator. For example, if 
God's purpose in creating is to share the value and joys of existence, and He 
is a perfect being, we would not expect creation to be in any way miserly or 
stingy. Instead, we would expect it to be liberal, magnanimous, profuse. 
Likewise, mirroring His perfection, we might expect a certain kind of effi-
ciency in creation. Now, in one standard form of its usage, the word "effi-
cient" connotes the careful husbanding of limited resources. But God, of 
course, is not limited in resources. There is, however, another closely related 
sense of "efficient," according to which the efficient person just acts in such 
a way as to attain the greatest possible ratio of ends to means: the greatest 
possible results are brought about with only the most modest means imag-
inable. This form of efficiency clearly can be connected with the property of 
being teleologically efficacious. 
When we consider our universe, we find a vast profusion of being. 
There is not just a single form of existence. There is not just a single star sys-
tem or a single galaxy. There is, rather, a bewildering, awe-inspiring quan-
tity and variety of beings to be found in the universe. Moreover, this profu-
sion of being seems to be the result of very few basic laws, perhaps only 
one. It would be difficult to imagine greater efficiency in this proportioning 
of means to ends. And this is clearly a universe conducive to life. Within the 
extraordinarily broad spectrum of apparently possible universes, only a 
tightly delineated range would be hospitable to the rise of life, sentient exis-
tence and conscious, intelligent beings capable of entering into moral and 
spiritual relations with each other and with a divine creator. From this per-
spective, our universe can appear purposive in just the way to be expected if 
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it is in fact a created realm. In short, our universe can reasonably be thought 
to resonate with just those qualities it would be expected to have if it were 
indeed the product of a divine act of creation properly described as rational. 
In the Judea-Christian tradition of reflection on matters theological, di-
vine creation is also believed to be in some sense, free. At the most basic 
level, this means that the act of creation is not causally compelled or con-
strained by the action of anything existing independent of God. God did not 
merely form our current cosmos out of partially resistent, or even perfectly 
malleable, previously existent material. No such mere forming or designing 
would capture the absoluteness of origination meant to characterize the fun-
damental act of divine creation. Traditionally, theologians and philosophers 
have sought to make this point by insisting that God has created this world 
ex nihilo, "from nothing." There is nothing distinct from God which is used 
by God as raw material for the formation of this world. Nor is the created 
realm cut from the cloth of the divine being. It is produced strictly ex nihilo. 
If it were not, the act of production would not be free from the compulsion 
or constraint of previously existent being, nor would it be as great and dra-
matic an act as it is. God is not just a molder. He is an absolute maker. The 
freedom of His creative activity extends to this great an extremity. 
Throughout the centuries, it has often been seen as central to the Chris-
tian conception of creation to affirm two other propositions about the scope 
of God's freedom with respect to the activity and products of creation: 
(1) God was free to refrain from creating any universe at all, and 
(2) In choosing to create, God was free to create some other universe 
instead of our universe.5 
However, distinct beliefs about the goodness and rationality of both the 
Creator and His act of creation have been thought by some philosophers to 
create philosophical problems for each of these affirmations. 
First, was God in fact free to refrain from bringing into existence any 
created beings? Could God have chosen to exist eternally without any crea-
tures? Or was there some necessity about His creating something rather 
than nothing? As we shall see in the next section, an ontology, or theory of 
existence, can be developed according to which there are necessarily exist-
ing objects distinct from God which lack His aseity, such items as numbers, 
properties and propositions, abstract objects which are necessarily created 
by a divine intellective activity. If there are such objects which depend on 
God for their necessary existence, He could not have refrained from creating 
them. His creation of them is necessary. But what about the creation of a 
universe of concrete individuals, of stars, planets, molecules and persons? 
Was God free to refrain from ever bringing into existence any such created 
realm as this? Was God free to refrain from creating any contingent objects, 
any objects which are individually such that any of them could have failed 
to exist? Some philosophers have thought not. 
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In the Middle Ages, a number of principles connecting being and good-
ness were widely endorsed by philosophically inclined theists. One of these 
we can refer to as the Prindple of Diffusiveness: 
(PD) Goodness is essentially diffusive of itself and of being. 
What this means is, roughly, that it is of the essence of goodness to be 
shared, communicated or conveyed. Goodness does not remain bottled up; 
it expresses itself. It is diffusive of itself and it is diffusive of being. Good-
ness is neither inert nor destructive. It is creative and productive of existent 
manifestations of itself. The Principle of Diffusiveness claims that goodness 
naturally expresses itself by bringing things into existence, by thus sharing 
the wondrous status of being. 
If this principle is true, if goodness is essentially diffusive of itself and of 
being, then, some philosophers have thought, God was bound to create 
some contingent universe or other. For God is perfectly good and perfectly 
powerful. He will thus seek to express His character by bringing things into 
existence, and nothing will prevent this manifestation of His goodness. He 
therefore necessarily will create contingent beings of some sort or other. And 
if this is true, He is not free not to create a contingent realm. 
In a number of recent essays, Norman Kretzmann has brought this prin-
ciple to our attention and has used it to argue that God's creation of some 
contingent universe or other is necessitated by His perfect goodness.6 
Kretzmann' s papers are models of historical care and theoretical philosophi-
cal argument. I find his case for the necessity of creation to be extremely at-
tractive on a number of grounds. A necessary connection between God and 
the world, or at least between God and the type of world we live in, would 
simplify immensely the construction of a defensible and plausible cosmo-
logical argument for the existence of God, as well as that of a good design 
argument; it would clarify the ultimate modal equality of the two basic ways 
of defining or conceiving of God, Perfect Being Theology and Creation The-
ology; and it would make a defense against the argument from evil a good 
deal easier in some respects. But I must admit that I have serious reserva-
tions about the application of the Principle of Diffusiveness needed for es-
tablishing such a necessary connection. 
What is the status of the Principle of Diffusiveness? It seems to have 
been an influential part of Neo-Platonist metaphysics, which has been found 
attractive by a number of great Christian thinkers. And it is natural to think 
of goodness as being, of its very essence, expressive of itself. It would be ex-
ceedingly odd to think of an individual as good, whose purported goodness 
was never expressed in any way at all. But is it necessary for perfect good-
ness to be manifested by the creation of contingent beings? It is hard for me 
to see how this interpretation of the principle could be thought compelling, 
or even very plausible, as it stands. 
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The moral goodness of a being is nahrrally expressed by what that being 
does. And many of the morally good things done by a person can be 
thought of as ways of passing along or sharing ("communicating," "diffus-
ing") the resources of one's goodness. It may even be the case that an indi-
vidual's goodness would be somehow truncated or incomplete unless there 
were some other person with whom to commune and to share. But Chris-
tians believe that God exists as three persons in one nahrre, eternally and 
necessarily. The eternally existing relations among these members of the 
divine Trinity are thought to encompass precisely the sort of communica-
tions of love, and sharings of goodness, that the legitimate insight behind 
the Principle of Diffusiveness requires. So, in order for divine goodness to 
be expressed in an interpersonal way, it was not, after all, necessary for God 
to bring about the existence of a contingent universe containing created per-
sons. It is expressed quite naturally in intratrinitarian relations. 
But some philosophers seem to have thought that such an internal ex-
pression of divine goodness, internal to the divine Trinity, would not alone 
suffice to satisfy the full requirements of diffusiveness. This appears to be 
Kretzmann's view. Completeness would demand an expression of divine 
goodness outside the bounds of divine life. The first sort of expression of 
divine goodness possible outside the orb of deity would have to involve the 
creation of other entities. Thus, if there is to be an external as well as an 
internal manifestation of divine goodness, there must be divine creation. 
It can be argued that if God necessarily creates numbers, properties and 
propositions and exists as a divine Trinity, any reasonable completeness re-
quirement concerning the diffusiveness of goodness is satisfied. God's 
goodness is expressed internally by trinitarian relations and externally by 
the giving of being to these necessary abstract entities. It is expressed both 
personally and metaphysically. 
It seems to me that, ultimately, the only way a diffusiveness theorist 
could plausibly insist upon the necessity of God's creating some contingent 
universe or other would be by insisting upon the truth of some sort of Prin-
ciple of Plenitude as well: 
(PP) Perfect Goodness necessarily expresses itself in as many ways 
as are possible, and produces as many kinds of good as it can. 
The existence of human beings is a good thing. It is possible for human 
beings to exist. It is possible for God to manifest His goodness by creating 
human beings. Therefore, by (PP), God must create human beings. (PP) thus 
seems to entail the necessity not only of God's creating some contingent 
world or other, but much more specific results as well. In fact, it clearly en-
tails too much. 
It is possible for perfect goodness to express itself by providing me with 
many millions of dollars with which to do good, and perhaps to buy a Jag-
uar sedan and a beach house. By (PP), I can be assured that God, being all-
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powerful as well as perfectly good, will diffuse His goodness in every way 
possible. Therefore, at some point, the check will be in the mail. 
This, of course, is crazy. Yet (PP) is not an absurd principle. Like (PD), it 
attempts to capture in logically precise form an insight about goodness. (PP) 
is an attempt to present, as a morally precise, metaphysical principle, the lib-
erality or generosity that characterizes true goodness. The problem is that it 
is exceedingly difficult to capture the essence of love or goodness in this sort 
of metaphysically exact form. 
It is natural for a man and a woman who love each other, and who are 
good people, to want to bring into existence a child, or children, with whom 
to share that love and toward whom to express that goodness. But it is not 
necessary for marital love and moral goodness to be expressed in this way. 
A person physically or biologically prevented from having children of his or 
her own is not necessarily condemned thereby to an incomplete state of per-
sonal goodness. A person is not necessarily less loving or good for choosing 
to remain celibate. Bringing new life into existence is a natural expression of 
love and goodness. But it is not essential. 
There is also no good reason to believe that maximization principles like 
(PP) actually succeed in requiring determinate tasks of an omnipotent being. 
First, there may be kinds of good, or forms of expression for goodness, that 
are noncompossible. So (PP) would have to be qualified accordingly. But 
even then, there is hardly any more reason to believe that there is a com-
plete array, or a best complete array, of compossible forms of creatable 
good, or expressions of goodness, than there is reason to believe that there is 
any such thing as a highest possible number. And without this, the require-
ment of (PP), even suitably qualified, would be wholly indeterminate. But a 
wholly indeterminate principle cannot be taken to be an accurate articula-
tion of any truth about reality. A wholly indeterminate principle does not 
succeed in specifying precisely anything in particular about reality, despite 
any appearances to the contrary. And whenever nothing in particular is suc-
cessfully specified with any precision about reality, no truth is accurately 
conveyed. In particular, it cannot be true that "Perfect Goodness necessarily 
expresses itself in as many ways as are possible, and produces as many 
kinds of good as it can" if there are no determinate, definite upper limits to 
the number of ways in which the expression of goodness is possible, or to 
the number of kinds of good that can be produced by the only sort of being 
who, in a theistic worldview, can be considered perfectly good, namely, the 
God who is also perfectly powerful. So it is quite reasonable to reject (PP), 
and thus the interpretation of (PD) which it provides. And I can find no 
other compelling reason to endorse the view that God must have created 
some contingent universe or other. 
With this conclusion, I believe we have secured our right to conceive of 
the scope of divine freedom with respect to the act of creation to be so exten-
sive as to encompass the freedom to refrain from bringing into being any 
contingent creatures such as ourselves. And such a conception is clearly 
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consonant with a very natural interpretation of the overall thrust of Perfect 
Being Theology, when it is brought to bear on this topic. For it surely would 
seem greater for God to have the most extensive range of freedom we can 
imagine, consistent with His never acting in such a way as to violate His 
character or nature. And in addition, with the conception of God as free 
never to have created any contingent beings, we have secured the basis for 
another important insistence of Christian theologians that the very existence 
of a universe at all should be experienced and accepted by us as a free gift 
from God. 
At the present time, I am convinced that God's creation is to be thought 
of as free in this most radical sense. And yet, it would be misleading for me 
not to admit that I feel the attraction of the necessitarian line, particularly as 
presented by Kretzmann-a philosopher whose work has proved time and 
again his uncanny instinct for sensing the deep insight behind apparently 
problematic or currently unpopular traditional views, whether they are ma-
jority or minority reports from the history of philosophical theology. In the 
present case, it seems to me, the power of the necessitarian view is tied up 
with the portrait of God to be found in the New Testament. Most theists 
concur in holding that God is perfectly good. The New Testament clearly 
presents that goodness as encompassing perfect love. The God of Jesus 
seeks to save the lost, as a good shepherd or a mother hen gathering her 
chicks together within the warmth of her presence. It is easy to imagine the 
boundless love of an infinite power as seeking to bring all possible creatures 
into the bright communion of actuality, leaving none to languish eternally in 
a netherworld of mere possibilia. Correspondingly, it is difficult to imagine a 
completely perfect God, who easily could share the joys of existence with 
creatures, deciding for all eternity that He would not. 
Our imaginations, however, are so formed by the actual that it is some-
times difficult to conceive of the remotely possible. Under the dispensation 
of being and goodness vouchsafed to us by the divine, it is quite hard for 
many of us to entertain a convincing vision of eternal trinitarian solitariness 
mitigated only by the unchanging co-presence of a necessarily existent 
realm of abstract objects. We are tempted to ask how a perfect God capable 
of creating finite persons at no cost to Himself could nonetheless eternally 
resolve not to share the wonder of existence in this way. It is not as if there 
is a limited metaphysical space to share with a created universe, or a limited 
amount of power, some of which would be expended on such a project and 
thereby lost for other purposes. 
But if this is our judgment on the cost of creating, we are focusing too 
narrowly on considerations concerning the being and power of God. Our 
created realm is marked by both beauty and blight. And, if anything like the 
polarity characteristic of traditional Christian eschatology is to be taken seri-
ously, the full cost of creating free persons may be far beyond our power to 
imagine. Furthermore, it may also be the case that any need we might sup-
pose there to be for the interpersonal flow of divine love and goodness to 
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spill beyond the bounds of intratrinitarian life reflects only our failure to 
grasp the magnificent completeness of that life, of which the Aristotelian 
conception of divine self-sufficiency is only the thinnest and most impover-
ished reflection. Intimations of such possibilities as these reinforce my sense 
that, as deeply attractive as the necessitarian line can sometimes appear, we 
are right to resist its strictures and insist on the fullest divine freedom with 
respect to the most basic issue of contingent creation. 
There is, however, one remaining objection to the claim that God was 
free not to create a contingent world. It typically proceeds by way of an ob-
jection to the other proposition about divine freedom mentioned when we 
began our examination of the freedom of creation: 
(2) In choosing to create, God was free to create some other universe 
instead of our universe. 
Critics of this claim have typically maintained that, since God is a perfect 
being, God's creative products must be perfect as well, since effects re-
semble their causes, or creations manifest the skill and greatness of their 
creators. So, as the greatest possible being, God could create only the best 
possible world. He has created this world. Therefore, this must be the best 
possible world, despite any appearances to the contrary. But if our universe 
is the best possible universe, God was not free to create some other universe 
instead. Proposition (2) is thus false. 
The great philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716) reasoned in this way, saying: 
Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less 
infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a 
kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the 
way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in 
the actions of God if it were possible to do better.7 
He further elaborates: 
Now God cannot will to do anything other than that which he does, 
because, of necessity, he must will whatever is fitting. Hence it 
follows that all that which he does not, is not fitting, that he cannot 
will to do it, and consequently that he cannot do it.8 
Leibniz even boldly describes how God chooses what to create. First, God 
knows all possibilities concerning what might exist. But then: 
The wisdom of God, not content with embracing all the possibles, 
penetrates them, compares them, weighs them one against the 
other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or imperfection, the 
strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes even beyond the 
106 Morris 
finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinities, that is 
to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of 
which contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine 
Wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated 
separately, into so many universal systems which it further 
compares the one with the other. The result of all these comparisons 
and deliberations is the choice of the best from among all these 
possible systems, which wisdom makes in order to satisfy goodness 
completely; and such is precisely the plan of the universe as it is.9 
And, making it all the more impressive, God accomplishes all this, accord-
ing to Leibniz, atemporally. 
This is clearly a majestic conception of the nature of the divine activity 
in creating. It has an undeniable, initial attractiveness for anyone committed 
to the method of Perfect Being Theology. But its troubling result is to tum 
creation into something akin to a mechanical procedure. God does an im-
mensely complex calculation, the result tells Him what world to create, and 
from that result he cannot deviate. He was not free to create any world dif-
ferent from this world in even the smallest respect-one more atom, or one 
less elementary particle. And, of course, by the same reasoning, He was not 
free to refrain altogether from creating a world. It was necessary that He cre-
ate the best. 
Critics of Leibniz have been quick to point out that this world certainly 
does not look like the best possible world. It is easy to think of many ways 
in which things could be improved. There are evils that could be eliminated. 
There are goods that could be increased. Leibniz's response is to argue that 
"the evil that occurs is an inevitable result of the best."10 From where we 
stand, it might seem as though the universe could be improved in a great 
many ways. We, however, fail to see the big picture. We are not in, and 
could not possibly be in, the best position to see how the many aspects of 
this world fit together into a whole and affect its overall value. Only God 
could occupy such a position. So appearances can be misleading, and 
should not alone cause us to reject the result of this reasoning. Such is the 
reply available to Leibnizians. 
In a highly influential article entitled "Must God Create the Best?" 
Robert M. Adams has resisted the Leibniz view in a different way.11 Adams 
suggests that God could create a less than best possible world without 
wronging anyone and without treating anyone, all things considered, un-
kindly. He maintains that God has no obligation to anyone to create only the 
best, and so God is free to graciously create good worlds which fall far short 
of being the best possible. But suppose Adams is right about God's having 
no such obligation. Do we expect manifestations of great goodness to be re-
stricted to contexts of obligation to some particular person or other? Could 
the mere fact that no one need necessarily be wronged by an inferior crea-
tion suffice to justify God's creating less than the best? Adams does not rule 
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out there being principles governing perfect goodness, truths constitutive of 
perfection, which would still generate Leibniz's conclusion. 
But is it at all plausible to think that, among all the possibilities for crea-
tion, there is a single best possible world? Leibniz thought that if there were 
no such world, God would not have created at all. But refraining from creat-
ing would have resulted in the circumstance of there existing nothing but 
God alone, a circumstance or state of affairs with great value, but, as we 
have seen earlier, a state of affairs with less overall value than that of God's 
existing along with a created universe. Leibniz, however, seems to have 
thought that God would never, and indeed could never, act without a fully 
sufficient reason for every aspect of His action. If there were no best pos-
sible world, and refraining from creation would not itself be a mode of di-
vine action, God would have no sufficient reason to create any possible 
world, and so would refrain from creating anything, thereby refraining, in 
this regard, from acting. 
The first point that must be made here is that we often think of our-
selves as refraining from action in a certain regard only on account of rea-
sons we have for so refraining. But if refraining from creating falls within 
the scope of possible reason giving, or the having of reasons, it is hard to see 
how Leibniz's argument here can go through, from his own point of view. 
God would have no sufficient reason to satisfy Himself with the state of af-
fairs of His existing bereft of any contingent creatures. 
But there is a deeper problem with Leibniz's argument on this point. If 
God is truly free, it can be argued that He can act without a completely suf fi-
cient reason for every aspect of his action. This is just what the fullest pos-
sible range of freedom involves. This point blocks Leibniz's reasoning here 
and also counts against another related Leibnizian conviction that if there 
were a class of best possible worlds, each surpassed by no other world but 
all tied in maximal value, then again God could not create at all, since He 
would have no sufficient reason to select one of those maximal worlds over 
the others. If He were truly free, however, He could just pick one. 
Thus, from the perspective of a robust conception of the range of God's 
freedom, it does not seem to be the case that in order for God to create at all, 
there must be a single best possible universe He could bring into existence. 
And this is surely a good thing, since it is extremely difficult to suppose that 
there is a single scale of value on which all possible creations could be 
ranked, with one and only one surpassing all others with respect to degree 
of overall value. There are all sorts of values which different sorts of crea-
tures might exemplify. And there is no good reason to believe that all these 
creaturely values are commensurable or comparable on the same scale of 
measurement. Some world A might be better than a rival world B in some 
respects, but with B surpassing A in some others, and the relevant values 
not such that they could be summed over and compared overall. There is no 
reason to suppose that things are as tidy as the Leibnizian perspective re-
quires. 
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Furthermore, as many philosophers have pointed out over the centuries, 
for any world composed of a certain number of good creatures, or exempli-
fying a certain number of goods, n, there is always conceivable a greater 
world with n + 1 goods, or good creatures. So, on the simplest, barest 
grounds of additive value alone, it seems impossible to suppose that there 
can be a single best possible world. And without this, Leibniz's overall argu-
ment collapses. 
If creation is to be good and rational, it must be consonant with the 
moral character of God. But if we are to think of it as truly free, we should 
be very wary of metaphysical principles whose effect would be to 
straightjacket the activity of God in this regard. If we have no good reason 
to think that there is or could be any such thing as a single best possible 
world creatable by God, and we have no good reason to suppose that there 
must be a sufficient reason for every single aspect of God's activity, then we 
have no good reason to follow Leibniz in believing that only a single world 
falls within the range of God's freedom to create. We can thus endorse both 
of the traditional affirmations that God was free to refrain from creating and 
free to create something other than what He did choose to create. 
In rejecting Leibniz's conclusions, however, we do not have to reject all 
his insights. Surely it is fair to expect excellence of workmanship in any di-
vine creation. Even if the perfection of the Creator cannot be manifest in a 
single perfect creation alone, God's surpassing greatness will surely mani-
fest itself in His creating only worlds of tremendous value. It is even natural 
to suppose that, with respect to whatever aspects of creation can be maxi-
mized, say, in certain kinds of efficiency, any world God creates will be the 
best possible in those respects. But this is far from supposing that there is a 
single best possible creation which alone God can bring into being. God will 
express Himself in His activity. But His freedom of expression is vast. 
CREATURELY DEPENDENCE 
We have been exploring the idea of God as a free, rational and good 
creator. In this section, we shall examine a bit more the way in which all 
things thus depend upon God for their existence. All things distinct from 
God stand in a dependence relation to God, a relation which is both direct 
and absolute. 
It is never the case that some created object x depends upon God only in 
the sense of depending for its existence upon some other created objects y 
and z, which in turn directly depend upon God. Every created object de-
pends upon God directly for its existence. There is no indirectness about any 
such dependence relation. It is not just that my body depends on air and 
water and other physical substances for its existence, and these in tum de-
pend upon God. Metaphysical or ontological dependence upon God, de-
pendence for being, is, rather, in every case direct. 
Such dependence is also absolute. God does not launch things into exis-
tence and allow them subsequently to persist on their own. He does not 
The Metaphysical Doctrine of Creation 109 
support an object's existence in only some of the circumstances in which it 
exists. The dependence is thorough and continuous. To convey this idea, 
many philosophers and theologians have spoken of God's activities of crea-
tion and conseroation with respect to the world. God does not bring things 
into existence and then take a hands-off approach to them. This is the error 
known as deism. God continually supports things in existence, moment to 
moment, throughout the entirety of their careers on the stage of reality. Di-
vine conservation is thought to be so absolute a requirement for existence 
that, if God were to withdraw His support for our contingent universe for 
even an instant, it would all cease to be. To stress the importance of the di-
vine activity to the continuous existence of any created object, some theolo-
gians have spoken of continuous creation. The idea is, roughly, that just as 
God creates an object at its first moment of existence, He recreates it at all 
subsequent moments at which it exists. Yet, as the term "continuous" indi-
cates, this is not to be thought of as involving a staccato repetition of numer-
ous, discrete creative acts. There is a continuity to the activity of divine crea-
tion which can be conceptualized either as conservation or as continuous 
creation. The important point is that at each instant of the existence of any 
created thing, it stands in a relation to God of absolute dependence. 
There is another feature of absoluteness manifested by the most exalted 
version of a metaphysical doctrine of creation. Absolutely everything dis-
tinct from God depends on God for its existence. This is a foundational 
claim for any thoroughly theistic ontology. If God is the greatest possible 
being, a maximally perfect source of existence, then He is not just one more 
item in the inventory of reality. He is the hub of the wheel, the center and 
focus, the ultimate support, of all. The difference between theism and athe-
ism is thus not just a disagreement over whether one entity of a certain de-
scription exists or not. It is a disagreement over the origin, and thus the ulti-
mate nature, of everything. 
God is often said to be omnipresent, or to have the property of omnipres-
ence. He is present everywhere in the realm of His contingent creation. But 
His presence is not best understood as something akin to physical location. 
It is rather to be thought of as a function of His knowledge and power. God 
is thought to be present everywhere in the sense that His perfect knowledge 
and power extend over all. There is nothing outside the scope of His aware-
ness or independent of the exercise of His creative power. He can act any-
where, and interact with anyone at any place. That is because He is ever-ac-
tive and ever-aware at every place. All contingent physical objects, all con-
tingent nonphysical objects, and all external relations which hold between 
and among them depend on God's activity of creation. Absolutely nothing 
in the realm of contingency exists independent of Him. 
But what of the realm of necessity? Are there necessarily existent entities 
distinct from God, such as properties and propositions or numbers? And if 
so, how do they relate to God? Following Plato, many philosophers over the 
centuries have believed that there are such abstract objects, that they do nee-
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essarily exist, and that it follows from this that they exist independently of 
any exercise of divine power. 
It is difficult, though, to conceive of what the existence of such inde-
pendent objects might amount to. For, following Plato, abstract objects are 
not thought of as existing anywhere in the physical universe. They are in-
stantiated, or exemplified, are true or false, or obtain, within the space-time 
realm. But they themselves have a more ethereal existence. Various human 
beings, for example, may be more or less just in their dealings with others. 
But justice itself-the property, the abstract entity-does not dwell in the 
land in any other than a metaphorical sense. 
Abstract objects existing in their own realms of being are also typically 
thought of as standing outside any causal relations whatsoever. But then the 
existence of such things does look sui generis, different from anything else 
imaginable, and very strange. For what is the difference between a thing's 
existing and its not existing? In all clear and relatively uncontroversial cases 
of existence, it seems that for a thing to exist is for it to have a place in a 
causal nexus, and thus to be capable of interacting with other existing 
things. If a tree exists outside my door, there is something out there I can 
bump into. There is something there which can cool me with its shade. 
Now, clearly, there are many things we can't just bump into, but their exis-
tence causally impinges upon us in other ways. For example, there are 
things whose existence is manifest only due to their abilities to causally af-
fect sensitive detection devices. But to say that something exists utterly out-
side any causal context at all is to break away from our clearest paradigms 
of what existence amounts to in a most decisive way. 
Because of these and other worries, some philosophers have denied that 
there is any robust sense in which abstract objects really exist at all. And if 
the position of these anti-Platonists is true, if there really are no necessary, 
abstract objects existing distinct from God, then from God's being the crea-
tor of all contingent things alone it would follow that there is nothing dis-
tinct from God which exists independent of Him. But it is difficult to con-
struct a metaphysically satisfactory world-view without acknowledging 
some objective reality for numbers, properties, propositions and the like. So 
a great number of theistic philosophers have found the severe anti-Platonist 
move unacceptable. They have wanted to endorse the reality of numbers, 
properties and propositions, and have seen a way of avoiding the problems 
which attend the conception of these entities as abstract objects existing au-
tonomously, wholly independently in their own realms of reality. To this 
end they have taken up and developed St. Augustine's suggestion that these 
things be thought of as ideas in the mind of God. The divine ideas tradition, as 
this way of thinking is referred to, maintains that it is an ontologically effica-
cious divine intellective activity which is responsible for the existence of 
these things which we customarily classify as abstract objects. They are 
ideas which God thinks, eternally and necessarily. And the creative efficacy 
of His thought gives them being. They are caused to exist by being thought. 
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And they are as they are in virtue of being thought of, or conceived, as they 
are by God. 
This is a powerful metaphysical perspective: God is the creator not only 
of contingent reality, but also of all those necessities which comprise the 
modal framework of reality. All possible worlds exist in God as thoughts in 
the infinite divine mind. He is the creator of possibilities, the eternal up-
holder of necessities. God necessarily gives being to the realm of abstracta, 
the framework of creation-so called because all the possibilities and necessi-
ties resident in the. divine mind structure all the available avenues of crea-
tive production, and thus all the ways the world can be. 
It is not that God brings such things into existence at a time prior to 
which they have not existed. If they are eternal objects, He must eternally 
have been creating them. If they are necessities, He creates them, or gives 
them being, in every possible situation. But if they owe their being to God, 
as they must on an absolutely thorough-going theism, their necessity does 
not entail their aseity or ontological independence. Necessity is compatible 
with created-ness. Only God is bo!h necessary and independent. 
If properties, propositions and the like depend on God for their exis-
tence, they can be thought of as standing in a causal nexus-they are caused 
to be by God. And the realm of their existence is clarified-it is God's mind. 
So the troublesome worries of standard Platonism are avoided, but without 
the cost incurred by strict anti-Platonism. And, at the same time, we have a 
view which is clearly consonant with a thoroughly theistic ontology. All 
things, including these things, depend on God. 
The theoretical benefits of such a view are great. When in seeking to 
understand the scope of omnipotence we find we must admit that God can-
not do the logically impossible, we are freed from having to think of God's 
activity being restricted by logical principles that have objective reality and 
force completely independent of Him. The principles that structure His ac-
tivities are ideas or thoughts in His mind whose existence derives from 
Him. Likewise, when in coming to appreciate the full stature of divine good-
ness, we say that God necessarily acts in accordance with moral principles, 
we do not have to think of objective moral laws as somehow existing "out 
there," independent of God, constraining His activity from above. They also 
are thoughts in the divine mind, existing as entertained by God, true as af-
firmed by Him, necessary as endorsed by Him in all possible worlds. 
The creation of necessarily existent abstract objects by God is interest-
ingly different from His creation of a contingent universe in many ways, 
and this should not be overlooked. The activity responsible for this realm 
will not be characterizable as "free, rational and good" in precisely all the 
same senses as the divine activity productive of a contingent world. It will 
be free only in the sense of being uncompelled and unconstrained by any-
thing independent of God. Its rationality will be essential, and of the most 
fundamental sort possible. Its goodness will consist precisely in giving rise 
to being which in tum gives rise to all the possibilities for contingent good. 
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With necessities, there is no selection. There is no alternative. But there can 
still be a dependence on God, a dependence which is both direct and abso-
lute. 
This is a fairly esoteric reahn of divine creation, but it was important to 
consider, however briefly, because it is important to see how the theist can 
subsume all things distinct from God under the umbrella of divine creation. 
The greatest possible being will be the most thorough source of reality imag-
inable. Everything will testify to His greatness. Nothing will escape His do-
main, not even abstract objects.12 
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